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Abstract—We develop a formal framework for the analysis of security protocols in wireless networks. The framework captures
characteristics necessary to reason about neighbor discovery protocols, such as the neighbor relation, device location, and message
propagation time. We use this framework to establish general results about the possibility of neighbor discovery. In particular, we
show that time-based protocols cannot in general provide secure neighbor discovery. Given this insight, we also use the framework
to prove the security of four concrete neighbor discovery protocols, including two novel time-and-location based protocols. We
mechanize the model and some proofs in the theorem prover Isabelle.
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1 Introduction
W ireless communications are flexible: a devicewith a wireless interface can start communicat-
ing with another device, an access point, or a base
station, almost instantly, without setting up a ca-
ble connection. As a consequence, wireless connections
are frequently established, making discovering devices
available for direct communication an indispensable
element of wireless networks. However, due to the open
nature of wireless communication, neighbor discovery
(ND) is easy to abuse: An adversary can convince
a device into falsely believing that another device is
its neighbor. The adversary can then use these false
neighbor links to disrupt the applications and services
that use ND as a building block.
The canonical example of such an attack comes from
routing in wireless ad hoc networks, such as sensor
networks, or multi-hop smart phone networks [1]. An
adversary can abuse ND by mounting a relay attack
(also known as a wormhole attack [15], [21]): Equipped
with two devices connected by a fast out-of-band link,
the adversary relays (without modification) any mes-
sage overheard by one device to the other side of the
wormhole (Fig. 1). This can create shortcuts across the
network the routing protocols are attracted to, with
a significant portion of the traffic routed through the
wormhole. The adversary can then eavesdrop, modify,
or simply suddenly start dropping messages, causing a
denial-of-service.
Securing ND is clearly of utter importance. It has
therefore attracted considerable attention from the re-
search community and a number of secure ND protocols
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Fig. 1. Wormhole attack in a wireless sensor network: The
adversary relays packets between two adversarial devices
(squares), creating false neighbor links. As a result, traffic
between the left and the right parts of the network (circled)
traverses the wormhole (thick dashed curve).
have been proposed. However, in the vast majority of
cases, such protocols have been only argued secure in
an informal manner. History provides many examples
of flaws in security protocols that can be overlooked by
such arguments. It is hence only natural to strive for the
strong security guarantees offered by formal methods.
This is the main goal of this paper: formal analysis of
secure neighbor discovery.
To this end, we develop a formal framework modeling
wireless communications. Our framework captures wire-
less communication aspects necessary to reason about
ND protocols, notably the neighbor relation, the de-
vice location, and the message propagation time. Such
aspects were abstracted away by “traditional” formal
approaches designed for verification of security protocol
in Internet-like environments.
Our framework allows us to obtain two types of
results. First, under what assumptions a given class
of protocols can or cannot provide secure ND? In
2particular, we prove that a general class of time-based
protocols cannot provide ND if the adversary can relay
messages with a delay below a threshold determined by
the desired communication range of the ND protocol.
Second, which concrete protocols can be proven secure?
With our framework, we prove the security of four such
protocols, two time-based ones and two in a different
general class of time-and-location-based protocols. Such
proofs greatly increase the confidence in the protocols
and they serve as secure ND possibility results for the
respective classes of protocols. Finally, we mechanize
our framework and a number of protocol security proofs
in the theorem prover Isabelle [19]. This provides an
additional level of assurance.
Paper Outline. In Sec. 2 we define the framework
and the ND specification. In Sec. 3 we sketch the
time-based protocol impossibility. In Sec. 4, we define
the protocols a refined ND specification, and present
the security analysis results. We also give an overview
of the Isabelle/HOL mechanization. We discuss the
assumptions and compare the protocols in Sec. 5. In
Sec. 6 we discuss the related work and open problems,
before concluding in Sec. 7.
2 System Model
The basic wireless network entities, nodes, are processes
running on computational platforms equipped with
transceivers communicating over a wireless channel. We
assume that nodes have synchronized clocks (although
not all protocols we consider in this paper make use
of this assumption) and are static (not mobile). Nodes
either follow the implemented system functionality, in
which case we denote them as correct or honest, or they
are under the control of an adversary, in which case we
denote them as adversarial nodes. Adversarial nodes
can behave in an arbitrary fashion, also acting as correct
nodes or lying dormant for any period of time.
To capture the inherent characteristics of ND in wire-
less networks, we model communication at the physical
layer rather than at higher layers (data link, network, or
application). For simplicity, correct nodes are assumed
to use a single wireless channel, but we do not require
them to have equal transmission power and receiver
sensitivity. Adversarial nodes can communicate across
the wireless channel used by correct nodes, but they
can also communicate across a dedicated adversarial
channel imperceptible to correct nodes.
Our system model comprises: (i) a setting S that
describes the type (correct or adversarial) of nodes,
their location and the state of the wireless channel; (ii)
a protocol model P that determines the behavior of cor-
rect nodes; (iii) an adversary model A that establishes
the capabilities of adversarial nodes.
We assume that looking at the system at any point in
time reveals one or more phenomena. We are interested
in those relevant to the wireless communication and
the system at hand and thus to our analysis. We de-
note these phenomena, associated with nodes, as events
(Def. 3). Then, we model the system evolution over time
using the notion of trace, i.e., a set of events (Def. 4),
in particular feasible traces that satisfy constraints
specified by S (correspondence between wireless sending
and receiving of messages), P (correct nodes follow the
protocol), and A (adversarial nodes behave according to
their capabilities). The constraints are defined by logical
formulas we call rules.
The model presented in the rest of this section is
used in Sec. 3 for the impossibility result. To reason
about the security of concrete protocols, we extend the
model in Sec. 4. In Sec. 5.1 we explain and justify all
simplifying modeling assumptions, made to keep the
model tractable.
2.1 System Parameters
The technologies used by correct and adversarial nodes
determine our model parameters:
• v ∈ R>0, the signal propagation speed, defining how
fast messages propagate across the wireless chan-
nel, determined by the communication technology,
• vadv ≥ v, the information propagation speed over
the adversarial channel ; as vadv ≥ v this is also the
maximum speed at which information can propa-
gate,
• ∆relay ∈ R, the minimum relaying delay introduced
by a node when relaying a message; this delay is
due to processing exclusively, it does not include
propagation time or any other delay.
• M, the message space; we keep the message space
unspecified for the impossibility result in Sec. 3;
we provide a concrete message space when we talk
about specific protocols in Sec. 4.
• |.| : M→ R>0, the message duration function.
Further, V denotes the set of unique node identifiers,
which for simplicity we will consider equivalent with the
nodes themselves.1
2.2 Settings
A setting describes the type and location of nodes, and
how the state of the wireless channel changes over time.
Definition 1. A setting S is a tuple
〈V, loc, type, link ,nlos〉, where:
• V ⊂ V is a finite set of nodes. An ordered pair
(A,B) ∈ V 2 is called a link.
• loc : V → R3 is the node location function. As we
assume nodes are not mobile, this function does
not depend on time. We define dist : V 2 → R≥0 as
dist(A,B) = d(loc(A), loc(B)), where d is the Eu-
clidean distance in R3. We require the loc function
to be injective, so that no two nodes share the same
location. Thus, dist(A,B) > 0 for A 6= B.
1. Although this implies that every node is assigned a single
identifier, it does not prevent an adversarial node from using (in
the messages in sends) any identifier.
3S1 ∀A ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m ∈M. Receive(A; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃B ∈ V. link(B→A, [t, t+ |m|])
∧ (Bcast(B; t− (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1;m) ∈ θ)
S2 ∀A,B ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m ∈M. Bcast(B; t− (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1;m) ∈ θ
∧ link(B→A, [t, t+ |m|])) =⇒ Receive(A; t;m) ∈ θ
S3 ∀A ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m ∈M. (Receive(A; t;m) ∈ θ ∨ Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ A ∈ V )
P1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R≥0,m ∈M. Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ Bcast(m) ∈ P(θ||A,t)
P2 ∀A ∈ Vcor, t, t′ ∈ R≥0, B,C ∈ V. Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t′) ∈ θ =⇒ Neighbor(B,C, t′) ∈ P(θ||A,t)
P3 ∀A ∈ Vcor. ∀t ∈ EA.  ∈ P(θ||A,t)
where EA = R≥0 \ start(θ|A ∩ I)
and I = {Bcast(t;m) | m ∈M, t ∈ R≥0} ∪ {Neighbor(t;B,C, t′) | B,C ∈ V, t, t′ ∈ R≥0}
A1 ∀A ∈ Vadv, t ∈ R≥0,m ∈M. Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒
∃B ∈ Vadv, δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(B,A)v−1adv. Receive(B; t− δ;m) ∈ θ
Fig. 2. Setting-feasibility rules, protocol-feasibility rules for protocol model P and adversary-feasibility rule for adversary
model A∆relay .
• type : V → {correct , adversarial} is the type
function; it defines which nodes are correct and
which are adversarial. This function does not de-
pend on time, as we assume that the adversary
does not corrupt new nodes during the system




• link : V 2 × R≥0 → {up, down} is the link state
function. Accordingly, we say that at a given
time t ≥ 0, a link (A,B) ∈ V 2 is up (denoted
link(A→B, t)) or down (denoted link(A9B, t)).
We use abbreviations link(A↔B, t) =def
link(A→B, t) ∧ link(B→A, t) and
link(A=B, t) =def link(A9B, t) ∧ link(B9A, t).
We extend the “link(A→B, t)” notation
from single time points to sets as follows:
link(A→B, T ) =def ∀t ∈ T. link(A→B, t). We
establish the convention link(A9A,R≥0).
• nlos : V 2 → R≥0 is the non-line-of-sight delay
(NLOS) function. If two nodes A and B can com-
municate over a line of sight, then nlos(A,B) = 0.
Otherwise, nlos(A,B) specifies the additional dis-
tance that the signal has to propagate compared
to line-of-sight propagation dist(A,B). We assume
this function is symmetric, because of reciprocity
of wireless links.
We denote the set of all settings by S.
We model the ability to communicate directly, with-
out the intervention or ’assistance’ of relays, by a link
being up, thus the following definition:
Definition 2. Node A is a neighbor of node B in
setting S at time t, if link(A→B, t). If link(A↔B, t),
nodes A and B are neighbors at time t.
For simplicity in presentation, we use “link(A→B, t)”
to denote the neighbor relation and the link relation.
2.3 Events and Traces
Events relate to the wireless communication and the ND
protocol operation. Each event is primarily associated
with (essentially, takes place at) a node we call the
active node.
Definition 3. An event is one of the following terms:
• Receive(A; t;m)
• Bcast(A; t;m)




where A ∈ V is the active node, t ∈ R≥0 is the event
start time, denoted by start(.), and m ∈ M is the
transmitted/received message, n ∈ Nonces is a nonce,
B,C ∈ V are nodes, and t′ ∈ R≥0 is a time instant.
The first two events are related to communication on
the physical layer: Receive represents message reception,
and Bcast represents message transmission.
Neighbor can be thought of as an internal outcome of
a ND protocol (possibly reported to some higher layer):
Node A declares that B is a neighbor of C at time t′.
Having t′ a single point in time is for simplicity only,
and we could easily generalize to arbitrary sets.
Fresh is used to declare that nonce n is (freshly)
generated by A at time t or, in other words, that it
was not sent before t. With NDstart, node A declares
that an instance of a ND protocol has been initialized:
either with a specific node B or with all neighbors.
We use the notion of trace to model an execution of
the system.
Definition 4. A trace θ is a set of events.
We denote the set of all traces by Θ. Given a setting
S, a protocol P and an adversary A, we denote the set
of traces feasible with respect to S by ΘS , the set of
those feasible with respect to S and P by ΘS,P , and
with respect to S, P and A by ΘS,P,A.
2.4 Setting-Feasible Traces
The feasibility of a trace θ with respect to a setting
S = 〈V, loc, type, link ,nlos〉 ensures a causal and strict
time relation between send and receive events; it is for-
mally defined by rules S1 – S3 (Fig. 2). Rule S1 ensures
that every message that is received was previously sent.
4θ|A,t ={Bcast(t1;m) | t1 < t ∧ Bcast(A; t1;m) ∈ θ} ∪
{Receive(t1;m) | t1 + |m| < t ∧ Receive(A; t1;m) ∈ θ} ∪
{Neighbor(t1;B,C, t′) | t1 < t ∧ Neighbor(A; t1;B,C, t′) ∈ θ}
Fig. 3. Local trace (Def. 6).
ND1 ∀S ∈ S, θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. ∀A,B,C ∈ Vcor, t, t′ ∈ R≥0. Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t′) ∈ θ =⇒
(C = A ∧ link(B→A, t′)) ∨ (B = A ∧ link(A→C, t′ + (dist(A,C) + nlos(A,C))v−1))
ND2 ∀d ∈ (0,R]. ∀A,B ∈ V, A 6= B. ∃S ∈ S. V = Vcor = {A,B} ∧ dist(A,B) = d
∧ link(A↔B,R≥0) ∧ ∃θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. Neighbor(A; t;B,A, t′) ∈ θ
Fig. 4. Basic ND properties.
Dually, rule S2 ensures that a transmitted message is
received by all nodes enabled to do so by the link rela-
tion. In other words, communication is causal (a receive
is always preceded by a sent), and reliable as long as
the link is up. Unreliability, expected and common in
wireless communications, is modeled by the state of
the link being down. Furthermore, these rules introduce
a strict time relation between events, reflecting the
propagation delay from A to B, across the channel,
with speed v: (dist(A,B)+nlos(A,B))v−1. Rule S3 is a
technical one: It ensures that no communication events
are performed by nodes not present in setting S.
2.5 Protocol-Feasible Traces
Intuitively, a trace is feasible with respect to protocol
P if correct nodes behave according to a particular
protocol P. To formalize this, we first define the notion
of a local view.
A trace is essentially a global view of the system
execution. To describe what a node observes during
a system execution, we use the notion of local view,
primarily comprising a local trace composed of local
events. We define these next. For simplicity, we ignore
the NDstart and Fresh events, as they are of no conse-
quence for the impossibility result.




where B,C ∈ V, m ∈ M, t, t′ ∈ R≥0. For a local event
e, start(e) is defined as in Def. 3.
Definition 6. A local trace is a set of local events.
Given a node identifier A ∈ V, time t ≥ 0 and trace
θ ∈ Θ, we calculate the local trace of node A at time
t in trace θ, denoted θ|A,t as shown in Fig. 3. We call
θ|A,∞ a complete local trace of A in θ and denote it
shortly θ|A.
We identify two variants of the local view notion: a
T-local view, as the basis for defining the class of time-
based protocols, and a TL-local view, used to define the
class of time- and location-based protocols.
Definition 7. Given a trace θ, a T-local view of node A
at time t in θ is a tuple 〈A, t, θ|A,t〉; we denote it θ||A,t.
Definition 8. Given a trace θ and a setting S, a
TL-local view of node A at time t in θ is a tuple
〈A, t, loc(A), θ|A,t〉; we denote it θ||S,A,t, or θ||A,t as the
setting S is clear from the context.
Note that S is part of Def. 8 as the location of node A
is defined only within a specific setting. With the notion
of the local view in hand, we can proceed with the
definition of a protocol model. This definition captures
the property of protocols essential to our investigation:
the fact that protocol behavior depends exclusively on
the local view of the node executing the protocol.
Definition 9. A T(TL)-protocol model P is a func-
tion which given a T(TL)-local view θ||A,t, determines
a finite, non-empty set of actions; an action is one
of the terms: , Bcast(m) or Neighbor(B,C, t′), where
m ∈M, B,C ∈ V, t′ ∈ R≥0.
The interpretation of Bcast and Neighbor actions is
natural. The  action means that the node does not
execute an event, with the exception of possible Receive
event(s). Note that modeling the protocol output (i.e.,
the protocol model co-domain) as a family of sets of
actions allows for non-deterministic protocols.
The feasibility of a trace θ with respect to a protocol
model P ensures that all correct nodes follow the
protocol; it is formally defined by rules P1 – P3 (Fig. 2).
Rules P1 and P2 ensure that the Bcast and Neighbor
actions taken by a node are allowed by the protocol.
Rule P3, with EA the set of all time instances in θ when
no event other than Receive happens at node A, ensures
that the protocol allows for a node perform no action.
Note that our definition of a protocol model only
requires that the behavior of the protocol is determined
by the local view. This is much broader than a possible
alternative approach, in which a protocol is modeled
by a Turing machine. But as our definition is an over-
approximation, the impossibility result remains valid
for more realistic protocol models.
52.6 Adversary-Feasible Traces
For the purpose of the impossibility result, we consider
first a relatively limited adversary, that is only capable
of relaying messages. Note that a weak adversary model
strengthens the impossibility result. We denote this
model as A∆relay , with the ∆relay > 0 parameter the
minimum relaying delay introduced by an adversarial
node; this delay is due to processing exclusively, and it
does not include propagation or transmission time.
Formally, the feasibility of trace θ with respect to
A∆relay is defined by rule A1 in Fig. 2: Every message
sent by an adversarial node is necessarily a replay of a
message m that either this or another adversarial node
received. In addition, the delay between receiving m and
re-sending it, or more precisely the difference between
the start times of the corresponding events, needs to
be at least ∆relay, plus the propagation delay across
the adversary channel (in case another adversarial node
received the relayed message). This condition reflects
the structure of the adversarial channel: Any two ad-
versarial nodes can establish direct communication.
2.7 ND Specification
We consider two types of properties that ND protocols
should satisfy. The first one pertains to correctness,
expressed through property ND1 (Fig. 4): If two correct
nodes2 are declared neighbors at some time, then they
must indeed be neighbors at that time. More precisely,
there are two cases: (i) Node A can declare that B is
its neighbor (i.e., A can receive messages from B) or
(ii) A can declare that it is a neighbor of C (i.e., C can
receive messages from A). In the latter case, property
ND1 requires link (C,A) to be up at not exactly time t′,
but rather (dist(A,C) + nlos(A,C))v−1 (propagation
delay) after t′. As our model mandates that the link
state is determined at the receiving end (node), if A
declares that it is a neighbor of C at time t′, a message
sent by A at t would be indeed received by C. In other
words, A is not forced to estimate the propagation delay
to make a correct neighbor statement.
The second type of property pertains to availability,
expressed through property ND2 (Fig. 4), tailored to T-
protocols. An additional notion needs to be introduced
to formulate satisfiable availability properties: neighbor
discovery (ND) range, R ∈ R>0. Typically, R is equal to
the nominal communication range for a given wireless
medium and transceiver technology. However, we use
R more freely as the communication range3 for which
ND inferences are drawn. In other words, nodes at a
communication range larger than R will not be required
to declare each other neighbors.
Property ND2 requires that for every distance d in
the desired ND range R, there should be at least some
setting in which the protocol is able to conclude that
a node is a neighbor (in some, not all executions);
2. The requirement that B and C be correct is explained in
Sec. 5.
A B A B 
D C 
(a) Sa (c) Sb
Fig. 5. Settings used in the impossibility result proof.
Settings Sa = 〈{A,B}, loca, typea, linka,nlosa〉 and
Sb = 〈{A,B,C}, locb, typeb, link b,nlosb〉. In both set-
tings, nodes A and B are correct, nodes C and
D are adversarial. The location functions are such
that distb(A,C) + distb(D,B) + vvadv
−1distb(C,D) +
v∆relay ≤ dista(A,B). The state of links does not change
over time and is shown in the figure (lack of arrow means
that the link is down). For all links and settings, nlos = 0.
The dashed arrow in (b) denotes the adversarial channel.
this setting should contain exactly two nodes, both
correct and at distance d, being neighbors. The “two-
nodes setting” requirement clarifies why we call this
two-party ND. The ND2 property is the least that can be
required from a usable two-party ND protocol: Indeed,
a protocol not satisfying this property would be unable
to conclude, for some distance(s) in the ND range, that
nodes are neighbors. This makes the impossibility result
in Sec. 3 more meaningful: impossibility with respect to
a weak property implies impossibility for any stronger
property.
3 Impossibility for T-protocols
We show in this section that no time-based protocol
can solve the two-party neighbor discovery problem as
specified by properties ND1 and ND2 in Fig. 4. We base
the proof on the fact that it is impossible for a correct
node to distinguish between different settings based on
a T-local view. This is captured by Lemma 1 below
Our impossibility result, Theorem 1 below, stems from
showing two settings that are indistinguishable by a
correct node, one with two nodes being neighbors and
one where they are not (Fig. 5). We elaborate on the
assumptions and implications of this result in Sec. 5.
We emphasize that the non-restricted form of the
message space M encompasses all possible messages
including, for example, time-stamps and any type of
cryptography, thus contributing to the generality of the
impossibility result.
Lemma 1. Let P be a T-protocol model, S and S ′
be settings such that Vcor = V
′
cor, and θ ∈ ΘS,P and
θ′ ∈ ΘS′ be traces such that local traces θ|A = θ′|A
for all A ∈ Vcor. Then θ′ is feasible with respect to T-
protocol model P.
Proof: We need to prove that P1, P2, and P3 (Fig. 2)
hold for θ′.
3. By “communication range” we understand the actual dis-
tance plus NLOS effects.
6P1 Take any event Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ′. Based on
Def. 6, we have that Bcast(t;m) ∈ θ′|A = θ|A.
Using Def. 6 again, we get that Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ.
Since θ is feasible with respect to T-protocol model
P, P1 gives us Bcast(m) ∈ P(θ|A,t). Using again
the assumption θ′|A = θ|A we get the desired
Bcast(m) ∈ P(θ′|A,t).
P2 The proof is almost identical as for P1.
P3 As θ satisfies P3, we have ∀t ∈ EA.  ∈ P(θ|A,t).
Since θ′|A = θ|A, we have E′A = EA and
P(θ′|A,t) = P(θ|A,t), which proves that θ′ satisfies
P3.
Theorem 1. If ∆relay ≤ Rv then there exists no T-
protocol model which satisfies ND1 and ND2 (Fig. 4) for
the adversary model A∆relay .
Proof: To prove that under the assumptions of the
theorem no T-protocol model can satisfy both ND1 and
ND2, we show that any T-protocol model that satisfies
ND2 cannot satisfy ND1.
Take any T-protocol model P satisfying ND2. Pick
some distance d ≥ v∆relay in the ND range (d ≤ R).
Property ND2 guarantees the existence of a setting such
as the one shown in Fig. 5(a) (we denote it Sa) and
the existence of a trace θ ∈ ΘSa,P,A∆relay such that
Neighbor(A; t;B, t′) ∈ θ. As θ is feasible with respect
to setting Sa, this trace has to be of the form shown in
Fig. 6.
In setting Sb, shown in Fig. 5(b), we have
link(B=A,R≥0). Consider the trace θ′ (Fig. 6), which
is is essentially the same as θ, but for nodes C and D
relaying all the communication between nodes A and
B. It is simple to check that this trace is feasible with
respect to setting Sb. It is also feasible with respect to
T-protocol model P: This follows from Lemma 1, as
θ|A,t = θ′|A,t and θ|B,t = θ′|B,t. Finally, θ′ is feasible
with respect to the adversary model A∆relay , because
δ2−δ1 = δ4−δ3 ≥ ∆relay +dist(C,D)v−1adv. Therefore θ′
belongs to ΘSb,P,A∆relay and together with Sb forms the
counterexample that we were looking for: A concludes B
is a neighbor whereas it is not. Thus, T-protocol model
P does not satisfy ND1. As P was chosen arbitrarily,
this concludes the proof.
4 ND Protocols
We consider here four types of ND protocols, with one
representative protocol per type. We distinguish be-
tween (i) beacon-based protocols (B-protocols), repre-
sented by PB/T and PB/TL, which require the transmis-
sion of one message by one of the protocol participants
and synchronized clocks, and (ii) challenge-response
protocols (CR-protocols), represented by PCR/T and
PCR/TL, which require a transmission of messages by
both participants but no synchronized clocks. Within
and across these categories, we distinguish protocols
according to their capability to perform time measure-
ments (T-protocols) or time measurements and location
awareness (TL-protocols).
Fundamentally, beyond authentication mechanisms,
all the ND protocols we consider measure the signal
time-of-flight (ToF) between two nodes: B-protocols,
with tightly synchronized clocks, are able to estimate
ToF by transmitting a single beacon message, whereas
CR-protocols require two messages, a challenge and
a response, for the same purpose. T-protocols accept
neighbor relations as valid if the ToF distance is below a
threshold, whereas TL-protocols require this distance to
be equal to the geographical distance calculated based
on nodes locations.
4.1 Message Space
We define next the message space M (unlike the un-
specified one for the impossibility result). Any of the
following is a message:
• an identifier A ∈ V,
• a timestamp t ∈ R≥0,
• a location l ∈ R3,
• a nonce n ∈ Nonces.
Moreover, two messages m1,m2 can be concatenated
to form a message 〈m1,m2〉. Furthermore, an asymmet-
ric authenticator authA(m) and a symmetric authenti-
cator authAB(m) where A,B ∈ V and m ∈M, are also
messages.4 For symmetric authenticators we assume
that authAB(m) = authBA(m). Essentially, messages
are terms, with the subterm relation is denoted by v.
Every message m has a duration |m| ∈ R≥0, which
determines the transmission delay (not including the
propagation delay), reflecting the bit-rate of the un-
derlying communication technology. We assume that
message duration is preserved by concatenation, but
not by an authenticator. For m = 〈m1,m2, . . . ,mk〉, the
duration is |m| = |m1|+|m2|+. . .+|mk| and the position
of mi in m is pos(mi v m) = |m1|+ . . .+ |mi−1|, with
pos(m1 v m) = 0; in the case of multiple occurrences
of m′ v m, pos(m′ v m) gives the position of the
first occurrence. When we use the duration function
for any concatenated message, we omit the brackets:
|m1,m2, . . . ,mk|. Finally, we assume that the duration
of identifiers, timestamps, locations, nonces and authen-
ticators in M is upper-bounded by some constant.
Notation: Assuming that m1 v m2, we use:
Bcast(A; t;m1 v m2)
to denote the event:
Bcast(A; t− pos(m1 v m2);m2)
Likewise for Receive.
4. Examples of asymmetric authenticators, digital signatures;




Bcast(A; ti;mi) | i ∈ IA
} ∪ {Receive(B; ti + ∆;mi) | i ∈ IA} ∪{
Bcast(B; ti;mi) | i ∈ IB
} ∪ {Receive(A; ti + ∆;mi) | i ∈ IB} ∪{
Neighbor(A; ti;A,B, t
′
i) | i ∈ JAA
} ∪ {Neighbor(A; ti;B,A, t′i) | i ∈ JBA } ∪{
Neighbor(B; ti;A,B, t
′
i) | i ∈ JAB
} ∪ {Neighbor(B; ti;B,A, t′i) | i ∈ JBB }
θ′ =
{
Bcast(A; ti;mi) | i ∈ IA
} ∪ {Receive(C; ti + δ1;mi) | i ∈ IA} ∪{
Bcast(D; ti + δ2;mi) | i ∈ IA
} ∪ {Receive(B; ti + ∆;mi) | i ∈ IA} ∪{
Bcast(B; ti;mi) | i ∈ IB
} ∪ {Receive(D; ti + δ3;mi) | i ∈ IB} ∪{
Bcast(C; ti + δ4;mi) | i ∈ IB
} ∪ {Receive(A; ti + ∆;B,mi) | i ∈ IB} ∪{
Neighbor(A; ti;A,B, t
′
i) | i ∈ JAA
} ∪ {Neighbor(A; ti;B,A, t′i) | i ∈ JBA } ∪{
Neighbor(B; ti;A,B, t
′
i) | i ∈ JAB
} ∪ {Neighbor(B; ti;B,A, t′i) | i ∈ JBB }
Fig. 6. Traces used in the proof of Theorem 1; ∆ = dista(A,B)v−1, ti, t′i ∈ R≥0 and IA, IB , JAA , JBA , JAB , JBB
are pairwise disjoint index sets with JBA 6= ∅ (all the other index sets can be empty); δ1 = distb(A,C)v−1, δ2 =
∆− distb(D,B)v−1, δ3 = distb(B,D)v−1 δ4 = ∆− distb(C,A)v−1
F1 ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0, n ∈ Nonces,m1 ∈M. n v m1 ∧ Fresh(A; t1;n) ∈ θ
∧ Bcast(B; t2;n v m1) ∈ θ =⇒ (A = B ∧ t2 ≥ t1) ∨ (A 6= B ∧ ∃δ ≥ ∆relay,m2 ∈M.
n v m2 ∧ Receive(B; t2 − δ;n v m2) ∈ θ)
A1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ Vadv, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0, n ∈ Nonces,m1 ∈M. n v m1 ∧ Fresh(A; t1;n) ∈ θ
∧ Bcast(B; t2;n v m1) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃C ∈ Vadv, δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(C,B)v−1adv,m2 ∈M. n v m2
∧ Receive(C; t2 − δ;n v m2) ∈ θ
A2 ∀A ∈ Vadv, B ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m,m0,m1 ∈M. m = authB(m0) v m1
∧ Bcast(A; t;m v m1) ∈ θ =⇒ (B ∈ Vadv)
∨ (∃C ∈ Vadv, δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(C,A)v−1adv,m2 ∈M. m v m2 ∧ Receive(C; t− δ;m v m2) ∈ θ)
A3 ∀A ∈ Vadv, B,C ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m,m0,m1 ∈M. m = authBC(m0) v m1
∧ Bcast(A; t;m v m1) ∈ θ =⇒ (B ∈ Vadv) ∨ (C ∈ Vadv)
∨ (∃D ∈ Vadv, δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(D,A)v−1adv,m2 ∈M. m v m2 ∧ Receive(D; t− δ;m v m2) ∈ θ)
Fig. 7. Adversary- and common protocol-feasibility rules.
ND2B/T ∀S ∈ S, θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t) ∈ θ ∧ link(A→B, [t, t+ TP ])
∧ dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B) ≤ R =⇒ ∃t′ ∈ [t,∞), t′′ ∈ [t, t+ TP ]. Neighbor(B; t′;A,B, t′′) ∈ θ
ND2B/TL ∀S ∈ S, θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t;B) ∈ θ ∧ link(A→B, [t, t+ TP ])
∧ nlos(A,B) = 0 =⇒ ∃t′ ∈ [t,∞), t′′ ∈ [t, t+ TP ]. Neighbor(B; t′;A,B, t′′) ∈ θ
ND2CR/T ∀S ∈ S, θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t;B) ∈ θ ∧ link(A↔B, [t, t+ TP ])
∧ dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B) ≤ R =⇒
∃t1, t2 ∈ [t,∞), t′, t′′ ∈ [t, t+ TP ]. Neighbor(A; t1;A,B, t′) ∈ θ ∧ Neighbor(A; t2;B,A, t′′) ∈ θ
ND2CR/TL ∀S ∈ S, θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t;B) ∈ θ ∧ link(A↔B, [t, t+ TP ])
∧ nlos(A,B) = 0 =⇒ ∃t1, t2 ∈ [t,∞), t′, t′′ ∈ [t, t+ TP ]. Neighbor(A; t1;A,B, t′) ∈ θ
∧ Neighbor(A; t2;B,A, t′′) ∈ θ
Fig. 8. ND availability properties.
4.2 Protocol-Feasible Traces
In Sec. 2.5 we have defined feasibility rules for arbitrary
protocols. However, for reasoning about specific proto-
cols, it is more convenient to define protocols with rules,
rather than specifying a protocol model function and
applying the general rules in Fig. 2.
The rules that specify this type of feasibility are
protocol-dependent and are defined in Sec. 4.5. How-
ever, there is one general rule that dictates the behavior
of correct nodes with respect to nonces. Rule F1 (Fig. 7)
guarantees that if a nonce n is freshly generated at
time t then (i) the node that generated n will not
broadcast it before t, and (ii) any other correct node
who broadcasts a message containing nonce n must
have received it (possibly in a different message) at
least ∆relay before broadcasting; this time difference is
measured with respect to the positions of the nonce in
the respective messages.
4.3 Adversary-Feasible Traces
To reason about the security of specific protocols, we
consider an adversary model, AP∆relay , stronger than
81: on NDstart(A; t1)
2: Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉)
3: on Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉)
4: if t2 − t1 ≤ Rv−1
5: Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|;A,B, t2)
Fig. 9. Pseudo-code for protocol PB/T.
that defined in Sec. 2.6. Intuitively, adversarial nodes
are allowed to send arbitrary messages, except for mes-
sages which would violate properties of authenticators
or freshness; these have to be relayed with the relaying
delay at least ∆relay.
A trace θ is feasible with respect to AP∆relay if rules A1
- A3 (Fig. 7) are satisfied. Rules A2 and A3 deal with
authenticators: An adversarial node is allowed to send
a message containing arbitrary authenticators, as long
as these authenticators can be generated by itself or
another adversarial node. This implies that adversarial
nodes can share cryptographic keys or any material
used for authentication. Furthermore, rules A2 and A3
reflect that the adversary cannot forge authenticated
messages: Any message sent by an adversarial node that
contains a correct node authenticator must be relayed.
In other words, some (possibly the same) adversarial
node must have received a message containing this
authenticator earlier, at least ∆relay plus the propaga-
tion delay between the two nodes over the adversarial
channel. This condition reflects the structure of the
adversarial channel: Any two adversarial nodes can
establish direct communication. Rule A1 is similar to A2,
but it is responsible for freshness: An adversary sending
a message with a nonce generated by a correct node
can only be relaying the message (nonce). In this sense
rule A1 is an adversarial equivalent of rule F1.
4.4 ND Specification
To reason about the security of specific protocols, we
use the correctness property ND1 as introduced in Fig. 4,
but we provide stronger protocol-type specific availabil-
ity properties. Informally, we require that if nodes are
neighbors for a long enough protocol-specific time TP ,
the protocol must declare them neighbors.
Fig. 8 displays ND2 properties for all types of protocols
we consider. These properties differ in four aspects, one
depending on whether the protocol is T or TL, whereas
the other three aspects depending on the protocol is
beacon or challenge-response. The first aspect is the
NDstart event: For CR-protocols, a particular neighbor
B with which ND is started is specified, whereas no
such specification is necessary for B-protocols. Second,
it may be required that link (A,B) be up only in one di-
rection (B-protocols) or both directions (CR-protocols).
Third, for T-protocols, an upper-bound on propagation
distance in enforced (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B) ≤ R),
whereas for TL-protocols line-of-sight propagation is
required (nlos(A,B) = 0). Forth, different forms of
neighbor declaration are possible. The node making the
declaration might be the same as (CR-protocols) or dif-
ferent (B-protocols) from the one initiating the ND pro-
tocol. Moreover the declaration might be uni-directional
(B-protocols) or bi-directional (CR-protocols).
4.5 Protocol Definitions
The protocols are formally defined by rules as the ones
in Fig. 10. To make the presentation more approach-
able, we first present the protocols informally in the
form of pseudo-code, and then we describe how the rules
model the behavior of the protocol. The pseudo-code is
divided into blocks, each starting with a triggering event
(on clause). Upon a triggering event, the block body is
executed, i.e., other events take place.
We start with a simple B/T-protocol we denote PB/T,
which is essentially the temporal packet leash proto-
col proposed by Hu, Perrig and Johnson in [15]. The
pseudo-code is shown in Fig. 9, the rules defining the
protocol are presented in Fig. 10. Block 1-2 describes
the behavior after the ND protocol is started at node
A (e.g., by a higher layer protocol); P1 and P2 are
the two rules that correspond to this block. Block 3-
5 describes the behavior of a node after it receives a
beacon message, and it is modeled by rules P3 and P4.
Rule P1 is straightforward: if ensures that if the trig-
gering event of block 1-2, NDstart(A; t1), occurs in the
trace, the event in the body of the block also occurs. In
the same fashion, rule P3 is defined for block 3-5, with
an additional condition coming from the if clause.
These two rules are already sufficient to prove the
ND2 property, but they only define half of aspects of the
protocol functionality. Indeed, nothing prevents a node
running this protocol from making arbitrary neighbor
declarations. Rule P4 addresses this, stating that if a
node makes a neighbor declaration, this has to be done
according to block 3-5, i.e., the node had to receive
a “fresh enough” beacon message. Only one aspect re-
mains: Correct nodes are still allowed to broadcast arbi-
trary messages, including bogus beacon messages. This
is addressed by rule P2. To motivate the definition of P2,
let us consider an alternative rule would still be coherent
with the pseudo-code: If a correct node broadcasts a
message at time t1, this message is 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉.
We can prove that such a protocol satisfies the ND
specification. However, this would be a weak result,
precisely because that rule states that correct nodes
cannot send any other messages than beacons. If the ND
protocol were used along with or by any other protocol,
obviously using other forms of messages, the result
would no longer apply. To circumvent this undesired
composability restriction, rule P2 only requires that if a
correct node broadcasts at t1 a message m of a partic-
ular form, i.e., containing authB(t) as a subterm, then
m = 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉. Hence, rule P2 gives a much less
restrictive condition on protocols that can be securely
composed with PB/T: basically, it mandates that any
9P1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, t1 ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t1) ∈ θ =⇒ Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ
P2 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, t1, t ∈ R≥0,m ∈M. authB(t) v m ∧ Bcast(A; t1;m) ∈ θ
=⇒ m = 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉
P3 ∀B ∈ Vcor, A ∈ V, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0. Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ ∧ t2 − t1 ≤ Rv−1
=⇒ Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|;A,B, t2) ∈ θ
P4 ∀B ∈ Vcor, A,C ∈ V, t2, t ∈ R≥0. Neighbor(B; t;A,C, t2) ∈ θ =⇒ C = B
∧ ∃t1 ∈ R≥0. Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ ∧ t2 − t1 ≤ Rv−1
∧ t = t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|
Fig. 10. Rules defining protocol PB/T.
01: on NDstart(A; t1;B)
02: Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1)
03: Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉)
04: on Receive(B; t; 〈B,n1〉)
05: Fresh(B; t+ ∆;n2)
06: Bcast(B; t+ ∆; 〈n2〉)
07: let τ > ∆
08: Bcast(B; t+ τ ; 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉)
09: on Receive(A; t; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉)
10: if occurred Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1)
11: if occurred Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉)
12: if occurred Receive(A; t2; 〈n2〉)
13: if v(t2 − t1 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l)
14: Neighbor(A; t+ |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|;A,B, t1)
15: Neighbor(A; t+ |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|;B,A, t2)
Fig. 11. Pseudo-code for protocol PCR/TL.
other protocol does not use authenticated timestamps
of this form.5 Rule P4, in terms of composability, implies
that the node cannot run any other ND protocol (i.e., a
protocol making neighbor declarations), but we do not
see this as a real restriction.
Next, we describe PCR/TL, a CR/TL-protocol
(pseudo-code Fig. 11, rules Fig. 12). This protocol has
a practical design twist: As authentication of a message
can be a time-consuming process, in this protocol we
remove it from the time-critical ToF estimation phase.
Otherwise, if the response needs too much time to
be calculated, the clock of the challenging node can
drift beyond an acceptable accuracy level. A protocol
parameter ∆ ∈ R≥0 determines exactly how long after
the challenge reception a node replies.
We assume that a node keeps track of all the events
it observes, and it can always refer to this ’history,’
as in 10-12. There is no explicit block responsible for
receiving the 〈n2〉 response sent by B in 06; node A
does not take any action other than recording the event
occurrence, for later reference in line 11.
Considering again that“triggering event implies block
body events,” rule P1 is defined for block 01-03, P2 for
block 04-08, and P4 for block 09-15. We do not define
rules that restrict the occurrence of Fresh events (in
5. If this would pose a problem, the protocol can be modified,
e.g., by authenticating a timestamp concatenated with some












B-based ∆relay > 0,v = vadv nlos(A,B) = 0
CR-based ∆relay > 0,v = vadv nlos(A,B) = 0
TABLE 1
Summary of assumptions for different ND protocol
classes in Theorem 2.
lines 02 and 05) or the form of broadcasted messages
(in lines 03 and 06), so that there is no obstacle for
composability. For line 08, rule P3 is defined: If a node
broadcasts a message m containing an authenticator
of the form authB(n1, n2, l), then m is precisely the
message defined in line 08, and all the other events
from block 04-08 occur. Finally, rule P5 is defined based
on block 09-15. There is only one rule, despite two
Neighbor events in lines 14 and 15, because both events
match the universally quantified Neighbor event in P5;
The rule uses a disjunction, as there are (small) timing
differences in the node behavior depending on which of
these two event is considered.
The pesudo-code for protocols PB/TL and PCR/T is
shown in Fig. 13 and Fig. 15. The rules defining these
protocols are shown in Fig. 14 and Fig. 16. We note,
however, that opposite to the other protocols, PB/TL
relies on symmetric authenticators. The purpose of this
is to demonstrate that the protocols can be modified to
work with symmetric cryptography. There is no specific
reason why we chose PB/TL for this demonstration.
4.6 Results and Isabelle/HOL Mechanization
We prove that the protocols presented in Sec. 4.5 pro-
vide secure ND, which is summarized by the following
theorem:
Theorem 2. The protocols PB/T, PCR/TL, PCR/T and
PB/TL satisfy ND1 and ND2 (the appropriate variant,
Fig. 8) for the adversary model AP∆relay under the
assumptions summarized in Tab. 4.6.
We comment further on these results in Sec. 5.2. We
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P1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, t1 ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃n1 ∈ Nonces.
Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
P2 ∀B ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R≥0, n1 ∈ Nonces. Receive(B; t; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃n2 ∈ Nonces, τ > ∆.
Fresh(B; t+ ∆;n2) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(B; t+ ∆; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ
∧ Bcast(B; t+ τ ; 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉) ∈ θ
P3 ∀B ∈ Vcor, C ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0, n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, l ∈ R3,m ∈M. authC(n1, n2, l) v m
∧ Bcast(B; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃τ > 0. m = 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉
∧ Receive(B; t− τ −∆; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ ∧ Fresh(B; t− τ ;n2) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(B; t− τ ; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ
P4 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, t1, t2, t ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3.
Receive(A; t; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ ∧ Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ
∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ ∧ Receive(A; t2; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ ∧ v(t2 − t1 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l) =⇒
Neighbor(A; t+ |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|;A,B, t1) ∈ θ ∧ Neighbor(A; t+ |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|;B,A, t2) ∈ θ
P5 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B,C ∈ V, t, t0 ∈ R≥0. Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t0) ∈ θ =⇒
(C = A ∧ ∃n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, t1 ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3. Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ
∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ ∧ Receive(A; t0; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ
∧ Receive(A; t− |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ ∧ v(t0 − t1 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l))
∨
(B = A ∧ ∃n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, t2 ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3. Fresh(A; t0 + |C|;n1) ∈ θ
∧ Bcast(A; t0; 〈C, n1〉) ∈ θ ∧ Receive(A; t2; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ
∧ Receive(A; t− |l, authC(n1, n2, l)|; 〈l, authC(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ ∧ v(t2 − t0 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l))
Fig. 12. Rules defining protocol PCR/TL
formalize our framework, with a few minor modifica-
tions, in the theorem prover Isabelle [19] with higher-
order logic (HOL). This allows us to mechanically verify
the proofs, greatly increasing the confidence in the
results. The pen-and-paper proofs for Theorem 2 and
the source code for the mechanized proofs are available
in App. A and [27], respectively. We use an extension of
HOL, the HOL-Complex logic that defines complex and
real numbers, because our model requires the latter.
In the Isabelle formalization process, we make one
noteworthy modification compared to our pen-and-
paper proofs: we model concatenated messages as lists
of simple messages (identifiers, time-stamps, locations,
nonces, authenticators). With this representation, we
have a one-to-one mapping between the messages in the
model, and “real-world” messages. Whereas one “real-
world” message concatenated from more than 2 simple
messages has multiple term representation, depending
on the order of concatenation.
We mechanized the most essential proofs: two cru-
cial lemmas, availability and correctness of the PB/T
protocol and correctness of the (most involved) PCR/TL
protocol. The proofs follow the pen-and-paper proofs
very closely. Each step of the pen-and-paper proof (i.e.,
each application of a feasibility rule) translates into
an application of a number of Isabelle methods. The
Isabelle source code for the model and proofs is roughly
2500 lines long.
5 Discussion
5.1 Abstractions and Simplifications
Mobility and NLOS Delay. We assume nodes are
static and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) delay is constant
1: on NDstart(A; t1;B)
2: Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))〉)
3: on Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)〉)
4: if t2 − t1 = d(loc(B), l)v−1
5: Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)|;A,B, t2)
Fig. 13. Pseudo-code for protocol PB/TL.
01: on NDstart(A; t1;B)
02: Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1)
03: Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉)
04: on Receive(B; t; 〈B,n1〉)
05: Bcast(B; t+ ∆; 〈authB(n1)〉)
06: on Receive(A; t2; 〈authB(n1)〉)
07: if occurred Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1)
08: if occurred Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉)
09: if v(t2 − t1 −∆) ≤ 2R
10: Neighbor(A; t2 + |authB(n1)|;A,B, t1)
11: Neighbor(A; t2 + |authB(n1)|;B,A, t2)
Fig. 15. Pseudo-code for protocol PCR/T.
over time. This simplifies the model significantly; oth-
erwise, propagation delay would vary during the trans-
mission of a message. This is a reasonable assumption,
because mobility and NLOS delay changes are very
minor at the ND protocol execution time scale. For
example, during 100µs, nodes moving at 100kmph tra-
verse 2.7mm, which is below the accuracy of most RF
ranging systems. However, in general, mobility can have
security implications. To see why, consider the PCR/TL
protocol. If nodes move during the protocol execution,
it is important when they estimate their location. At the
very least, A should estimate its location once when it
sends the challenge, and again when it receives the re-
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P1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, t1 ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ =⇒
Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))〉) ∈ θ
P2 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B,C ∈ V, t1, t ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3,m ∈M. authCB(t, l) v m ∧ Bcast(A; t1;m) ∈ θ
=⇒ m = 〈A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))〉
P3 ∀B ∈ Vcor, A ∈ V, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3. Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)〉) ∈ θ
∧ t2 − t1 = d(loc(B), l)v−1 =⇒ Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, l, authA(t1, l)|;A,B, t2) ∈ θ
P4 ∀B ∈ Vcor, A,C ∈ V, t2, t ∈ R≥0. Neighbor(B; t;A,C, t2) ∈ θ =⇒ C = B
∧ ∃t1 ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3. Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)〉) ∈ θ ∧ t2 − t1 = d(loc(B), l)v−1
∧ t = t2 + |A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)|
Fig. 14. Rules defining protocol PB/TL
P1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, t1 ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ =⇒
∃n1 ∈ Nonces. Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
P2 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, t1 ∈ R≥0, n1 ∈ Nonces. Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ =⇒
Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ
P3 ∀B ∈ Vcor, A ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0, n1 ∈ Nonces. Receive(B; t; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ =⇒
Bcast(B; t+ ∆; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ
P4 ∀B ∈ Vcor, C ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0, n1 ∈ Nonces,m ∈M. authC(n1) v m
∧ Bcast(B; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ m = 〈authB(n1)〉 ∧ Receive(B; t−∆; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
P5 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, n1 ∈ Nonces, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0.
Receive(A; t2; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ ∧ Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
∧ v(t2 − t1 −∆) ≤ 2R =⇒
Neighbor(A; t2 + |authB(n1)|;A,B, t1) ∈ θ ∧ Neighbor(A; t2 + |authB(n1)|;B,A, t2) ∈ θ
P6 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B,C ∈ V, t, t0 ∈ R≥0. Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t0) ∈ θ =⇒
(C = A ∧ ∃n1 ∈ Nonces, t1 ∈ R≥0. Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
∧ Receive(A; t0; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ ∧ v(t0 − t1 −∆) ≤ 2R)
∨
(B = A ∧ ∃n1 ∈ Nonces, t2 ∈ R≥0. Fresh(A; t0 + |C|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t0; 〈C, n1〉) ∈ θ
∧ Receive(A; t2; 〈authC(n1)〉) ∈ θ ∧ v(t2 − t0 −∆) ≤ 2R)
Fig. 16. Rules defining protocol PCR/T
sponse; whereas the responding node B should estimate
its location when it sends the response. But even this
might be insufficient under high mobility: If A measures
its location at the beginning of the message, while B
measures the ToF at the end of the message, there
may be space for a stealthy relay attack. Introducing
mobility and a dynamically changing NLOS delay in
our model is a possible direction for future work.
Medium Access Control, Jamming, Direc-
tional Antennas. For simplicity, we do not introduce
any MAC restrictions into the model. Hence, a node
is able to simultaneously receive any finite number
of messages, even though in reality it is limited (to
one message, or more for CDMA-like technologies). We
could introduce additional rules that model radio inter-
ference, e.g., set links down if two (or more, depend-
ing on the node transceiver capabilities) simultaneous
transmissions take place. However, this would not affect
any of our results. Notably, the availability properties
require links to be up, but they are agnostic as to
why links are up or down. Similarly, jamming would
not affect our results either: we capture jamming with
links being down, thus availability implies, among other
things, no jamming. An adversary using directional
antennas can also be modeled by links being down.
Inaccuracies. We assume correct nodes have accu-
rate time and location information. However, in reality,
inaccuracies are inevitable. Regarding time, clocks may
be coarse-grained and they can drift. Furthermore,
there is always some error in estimating the message
reception time (time-of-arrival) over a noisy channel.
Regarding location, infrastructure (e.g., the Global Po-
sitioning System (GPS), or base stations) providing lo-
cation information may be temporarily unavailable, and
the location provided also includes some measurement
error. Some of the inaccuracies can be decreased: For
example, the error in message time-of-arrival can be
decreased by averaging over many messages or introduc-
ing long physical-communication-layer preambles. But
some inaccuracy in time and location is unavoidable.
Inaccuracies do not diminish the impossibility result;
Rather, they make it stronger. Indeed, we prove the
impossibility result holds even in an idealized envi-
ronment, in which nodes have access to information
more accurate than in reality. In contrast, as secure
ND protocols rely on distance estimates, their effec-
tiveness can be negatively affected by such inaccu-
racies. For T-protocols, and even more so for TL-
protocols, inaccuracies hinder availability: they can lead
to ToF estimates seemingly above the threshold for T-
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protocols, and make the two distance estimates diverge
for TL-protocols. The only way to cope with these is
to introduce some tolerance margins for measurements.
Nonetheless, this affects correctness: The higher the
tolerance margin, the more space is left for fast relay at-
tacks. This manifests the unsurprising tension between
correctness and availability. Introducing inaccuracies
explicitly into the framework is a possible direction for
future work.
Physical Layer Attacks. The messages consid-
ered in our framework, albeit at the physical layer,
are composed of “atomic” components, such as nonces
and identifiers, typically assumed in formal security
frameworks. In [6], Clulow et al. pointed out a number
of physical layer attacks, working at the symbol (or
bit) level, that can decrease the perceived message
reception time. With external adversaries, as per our
ND specification, these attacks [6] can result in a (per-
ceivably) negative ∆relay. This can be expressed in our
model. Furthermore, the external malicious interference
attack introduced in [25] can be modeled with minor
extensions, e.g., making the nlos function depend on
time and allow negative values. Hence, our framework
(notably the “atomicity” assumptions) is not limited
with respect to those attacks. But it is so for physical-
communication-layer attacks introduced by internal ad-
versaries, as discuss in Sec. 6.
Fingerprinting. The framework proposed in this
paper does not capture the capabilities of wireless re-
ceivers to perform device fingerprinting, i.e., to identify
a transmitter based on the characteristics of the signal
it transmits [28]. This potential receiver capability has
implications, notably for the impossibility result. If the
model were to include some form of fingerprinting, then
the indistinguishability of local views would not hold,
and the impossibility result would be lifted. It is not
clear how such capabilities could be introduced into a
formal framework, especially because these techniques
are relatively recent, and we have only limited under-
standing of the hardness of fingerprint spoofing [8].
Integrating these into a formal framework is a possible
direction of future work.
5.2 ND Protocol Comparison
T-protocols versus TL-protocols. On one hand,
TL-protocols provide stronger security than T-
protocols in term of correctness (Tab. 4.6). First,
they do not need the notion of ND range, R, that
T-protocols do. More important, they are secure as
long as ∆relay > 0. In contrast, T-protocols require that
∆relay ≥ Rv−1. On the other hand, TL-protocols suffer
in terms of availability: (i) they require location-aware
nodes with secure and precise location information, a
far-from-trivial requirement, and (ii) they do not work
for links with substantial NLOS delay. In addition,
TL-protocols require v = vadv for correctness, which
limits them to speed-of-light channels such as RF.
In light of these shortcomings, notably (i), T-
protocols can be a viable solution to provide com-
munication ND, depending on the environment, the
communication technology, and the sophistication of
the adversary. First, T-protocols provide a good ap-
proximation of communication ND in environments
without obstacles, although these are not very common
in reality. Second, if the ND range R is low, than
the adversary needs to be able to relay with a small
∆relay. For example, if we consider relatively short-
range IEEE 802.11 radios, with R in the order of 100
meters, ∆relay ≈ 100mc−1 ≈ 333ns. This is significantly
below the 15−20µs achievable by the relay constructed
by Hancke in [12]. Simple store-and-forward relays are
also thwarted easily. In contrast, for WiMAX, with a
range up to 50km, the lower-bound on ∆relay is around
166µs leaving much more space for attacks. In fact, as
R→∞, T-protocols become useless for securing ND.
In [10], Francillon et al construct an analog relay
with ∆relay ≈ 20ns. A ND range R secure against such
a relay is only a few meters. Furthermore, for many
wireless technologies, 20ns falls below the accuracy of
the message time-of-arrival estimation. This implies
that for practical purposes this relay could be assumed
to achieve ∆relay ≈ 0, which would defeat not only
T-protocols but nearly TL-protocols too. Furthermore,
physical-communication-layer attacks [6] that construct
a relay with a (seemingly) negative ∆relay, would also
defeat both classes of protocols.
Hence, it might appear that for a sophisticated
enough adversary, communication ND is impossible
not only for T-protocols, but also for TL-protocols.
However, there is a significant difference between these
two “impossibility results.” For TL-protocols, the diffi-
culty stems from the inaccuracy of time- and location-
measurements. These can be decreased by, e.g., in-
creasing the signal-to-noise ratio through making the
message preambles (on which the time-of-arrival is esti-
mated) longer. Furthermore, physical-communication-
layer attacks can be mitigated with appropriate coun-
termeasures [13], [26]. In contrast, the T-protocol im-
possibility is fundamental, and holds even in an ideal-
ized model with no inaccuracies and no physical layer
attacks.
B-protocols versus CR-protocols. B-protocols
require (secure) clock synchronization, which limits
their applicability, but they are more efficient. B-
protocols involve fewer messages per protocol session; a
group of n fully connected nodes only needs O(n) pro-
tocol sessions versus O(n2) necessary for CR-protocols.
Furthermore, B-protocols have less stringent availabil-
ity requirements: links need be up for shorter periods
than those needed by CR-protocols. Finally, in terms
of correct (secure) operation, CR/T-protocols require
∆relay, the minimum relaying delay, to be twice as large
as that required by B/T-protocols (for the same R).
Symmetric Authenticators. Contrary to other
protocols, the PB/TL protocol uses a symmetric authen-
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ticator. For this reason, this protocol might seem at
the first glance susceptible to a reflection attack: an
adversarial node could receive a beacon message from
node A and relay it back to A. The PB/TL protocol
is actually secure. Furthermore, we could modify all
the other protocols by simply replacing asymmetric
authenticators with symmetric ones, and they would
still be secure under the same assumptions as their
asymmetric counterparts. However, if we would remove
the time and location information from the symmetric
versions of the protocols, in an attempt to use them as
regular authentication protocols, they would be all be
vulnerable to the reflection attack. This demonstrates
and interesting interplay between authentication and
time/location features of ND protocols.
5.3 Beyond ND
In this paper, we focus on formal analysis of ND.
However, our framework can be easily used to reason
about other protocols, e.g., for time synchronization or
distance bounding (DB). The latter, allowing one device
to estimate a secure upper-bound on its distance to
another device, have attracted considerable attention
from the research community, especially their formal
verification (see Sec. 6). However, there is a crucial rea-
son why we refrain from reasoning about DB protocols.
In ND protocols, traditionally, it is assumed that both
participating nodes are honest. Under this assumption,
our model is an adequate representation of the wire-
less communication reality. In contrast, DB protocols
assume that they can be executed with an adversarial
node. If this is the case, an internal adversary is able to
mount probabilistic bit-level attacks [6] that cannot be
captured by our model and, in fact, by the majority of
formal models developed for DB. There requires a new
type of model that is probabilistic and models messages
at the bit-level.
6 Related Work
A number of ND protocols can be found in the lit-
erature, but such schemes require the assistance of
infrastructure or other nodes, and are hence not as
generally applicable as the two-party ND we investigate
in this paper. Among two-party ND, there are time-
based approaches, notably the temporal packet-leashes
[15], and the TrueLink challenge-response protocol [9];
location-based approaches such as the geographical
packet-leashes [15]; an approach based on using di-
rectional antenna [14], which provides relatively weak
security guarantees in its basic two-part form; and a
scheme based on device fingerprinting [28]. For a more
comprehensive overview of ND schemes we refer the
reader to [20].
Impossibility Results. In [5] the problem of secure
clock synchronization under relay attacks turns out to
be closely related to communication ND. Compared to
our model, the model in [5] includes clock skews and
an adversary model with the distinction of half-duplex,
full-duplex and double full-duplex transceivers, rather
than the relaying delay. The authors obtain impossibil-
ity and possibility results for the considered transceiver
types, which are complementary to the results obtained
here. In contrast to our work, the authors abstract
away the cryptographic aspect of the protocols – hence
their framework cannot be directly use to prove the
correctness of concrete protocols in the same way as
our framework. This work is further extended in [29] to
protocols for network-wide clock synchronization and
topology discovery, but again cryptographic aspects are
abstracting away.
Formal Verification of Protocols. A number of
formal frameworks designed for verification of time-
(and-location)-based protocols have been proposed.
Contrary to our work, they tend to focus on distance
bounding (DB) rather than communication ND. DB
protocols allow a node to establish a secure upper-
bound on the distance to another node. The two most
prominent protocols of this type are the (original DB)
Brands-Chaum [3] and the Hancke-Kuhn [11] protocols.
The first work where DB has been treated formally
is [17] by Meadows et al. The authors extend exist-
ing formal approaches [4], [23] tailored to “classical”
security protocols, and augments it with a notion of
distance based on time-stamps. It is not clear how
communication neighborhood would be defined in this
framework, nor how to model a protocol that uses
location information.
In [30], Schaller et al propose a framework based
on the inductive active approach of Paulson [22]. The
framework is formalized in the theorem prover Isabelle
using Higher Order Logic. The authors use their frame-
work to verify two DB protocols, as well as a delayed
key disclosure protocol. They extend this approach in
[2], proposing an elegant way of dealing with message
spaces based on equational term theories. This, in par-
ticular, allows them to model the exclusive or (XOR)
operation used in the Brands-Chaum protocols.
In [16], the authors extend the stand space model
with timing information. The approach is automatized
using the constrained solving techniques proposed in
[18] for bounded-process analysis. The authors analyze
4 distance bounding protocols, including a simplified
version of the Brands-Chaum protocol, and a protocols
proposed in [17]. They replace the XOR operation with
symmetric encryption, and remove the commitment
used in this protocol. The authors report that the
constraint solver can efficiently find attacks in flawed
versions of the protocols.
The authors of [32] extend the strand space formalism
[31] with notions of message propagation time and
device location to be able to reason about the security
of simple DB and related protocols. No mechanization
of the security proofs is provided.
Interestingly, in none of the above frameworks is it
possible to prove the correctness of the (non-simplified)
14
Brands-Chaum protocol or the Hancke-Kuhn protocol
[11]. One reason for this is the ability to model necessary
“cryptographic”primitives: the combination of the XOR
operation with the commitment in the Brands-Chaum
protocol and the look-up operation in the Hancke-Kuhn
protocol. More important, none of these frameworks
models messages on the bit-level, and hence they miss
the attack mentioned in Sec. 5.3. We believe these
types of attacks should be possible to capture in any
framework to prove the security of ND or DB proto-
cols against internal adversaries. This would require a
shift from non-deterministic, message-based models to
a probabilistic bit-based models.
One formal approach takes this leap: the framework
of Pavlovic and Meadows introduced in [24]. It includes
probabilistic derivation based on the notion of guards,
it models messages on the bit level, and it incorpo-
rates the Hancke-Kuhn look-up operation. In fact, [24]
provides the first formal analysis of the Hancke-Kuhn
protocol. However, the analysis and the paper has some
limitations. The most important is that it is limited
to two specific guessing attack scenarios (one distance
fraud and one mafia fraud); nothing is mentioned about
the terrorist fraud, to which the Hancke-Kuhn protocol
is vulnerable. Such approaches, iterating over a list
of high-level attack scenarios, offer limited security,
because they ignore possibly undiscovered attack sce-
narios. An example of this limitation is the recently
discovered distance hijacking attack scenario [7], which
is different from the traditional distance fraud, mafia
fraud, and terrorist fraud. In contrast, the strength
of most formal approaches lies in considering a much
broader scope of adversarial actions, and only restrict-
ing the adversary from violating causality, physical time
and location constraints, and the security of crypto-
graphic primitives. In [16], such an approach allowed
the authors to detect a distance hijacking attack.
Compared to our framework, all the above-mentioned
formal approaches focus on verification of concrete pro-
tocols. In some cases (e.g., [17], [30]) the authors move
beyond the security of concrete protocols and show that
all protocols of a particular form provide DB. However,
there are no formal proofs of impossibility. Furthermore,
our framework has another advantage (stemming from
its impossibility-driven design). For example, in [30],
the set of all “feasible traces” is the minimum set of
traces in which correct nodes follow the protocol. This,
strictly speaking, means that the protocol is proven
correct under the assumption that nodes do not execute
any other protocol. In our approach, we consider the
maximum set of traces in which correct nodes do not
violate the protocol. Although this makes the protocol
specification slightly more involved, it allows us to
formalize a protocol in a way that can lead to stronger
results, e.g., we prove that a protocol PB/T can be safely
composed with any other protocol that does not use
messages of a particular form.
7 Conclusions
We propose a formal framework for reasoning about the
security of time-and-location-based protocols in wireless
networks. The framework models aspects of wireless
communications (neighbor relation, device locations,
message propagation time). It is applicable to protocols
such as distance bounding, time synchronization, and
most notably neighbor discovery, which is the focus of
this work.
We use the proposed framework to obtain two types
of results. First, we show that the general class of
time-based protocols can provide ND if and only if the
adversary can only relay messages with a delay above a
certain threshold (related to the desired communication
range). We also show that time-and-location based
protocols offer superior security, as they can provide ND
as soon as adversarial relaying delay is strictly positive.
However, these protocols only work for speed-of-light
channels and if there is no non-line-of-sight propagation
delay. Second, we use the framework to prove the secu-
rity of concrete ND protocols, including two novel time-
and-location based protocols. We mechanize the model
and proofs in the theorem prover Isabelle, for a high
level of guarantee on the security of these protocols.
We argue that the proposed framework is adequate
for reasoning about ND (and related protocols) un-
der the assumption that both participating nodes are
honest. However, if one of the nodes is allowed to
be adversarial – a common assumption for distance
bounding protocols – then this opens a whole new range
of probabilistic bit-level attacks, as well as attacks on
the physical-communication-layer. This mandates, in
our opinion, a shift from (non-)deterministic message-
oriented models to probabilistic models that explic-
itly consider bits or even symbols at the physical-
communication-layer. We believe this to be an inter-
esting direction for future work.
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L1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0, n ∈ Nonces,m ∈M. A 6= B ∧ n v m ∧ Fresh(A; t1;n) ∈ θ
∧ (Bcast(B; t2;n v m) ∈ θ ∨ Bcast(B; t2;n v m) ∈ θ) =⇒ t2 ≥ t1 + dist(A,B)v−1adv + ∆relay
L2 ∀A ∈ Vadv, B ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m,m0,m1 ∈M. m = authB(m0) v m1
∧ Bcast(A; t;m v m1) ∈ θ =⇒ (B ∈ Vadv)
∨ (∃C ∈ Vcor, δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(C,A)v−1adv,m2 ∈M. m v m2 ∧ Bcast(C; t− δ;m v m2) ∈ θ)
L3 ∀A ∈ Vadv, B,C ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m,m0,m1 ∈M. m = authBC(m0) v m1
∧ Bcast(A; t;m v m1) ∈ θ =⇒ (B ∈ Vadv) ∨ (C ∈ Vadv)
∨ (∃D ∈ Vcor, δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(D,A)v−1adv,m2 ∈M. m v m2 ∧ Bcast(D; t− δ;m v m2) ∈ θ)
Fig. 17. Rules for Lemmas.
Appendix A
Proofs
We prove that protocols defined in Sec. 4.5 satisfy the ND1 property and the appropriate ND2 properties. First, we
present three simple lemmas which facilitate subsequent proofs. Lemma 2 deals with freshness and is an extension
of rules S2 and F1, whereas Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 deal with authenticators, extending A2 and A3, respectively.
We start with the proof of Lemma 3, because the proof of Lemma 2 follows a similar patter, but is slightly more
involved. The proof of Lemma 4 is virtually identical to the proof of Lemma 3, and thus omitted.
Lemmas
Lemma 2. Rule L1 (Fig. 17) holds for every trace θ feasible with respect to the adversary model AP∆relay (∆relay >
0), some setting S and rule F1
Lemma 3. Rule L2 (Fig. 17) holds for every trace θ feasible with respect to the adversary model AP∆relay (∆relay >
0) and some setting S.
Lemma 4. Rule L3 (Fig. 17) holds for every trace θ feasible with respect to the adversary model AP∆relay (∆relay >
0) and some setting S.
Proof: (Lemma 3)
The 1st disjunct of L2, (B ∈ Vadv), follows immediately from A2, so we assume that B ∈ Vcor and focus on the
2nd disjunct. We we prove it by contradiction. Fix m = authB(m0). Our goal is to show that by assuming:
(1) m v m1 and
(2) Bcast(C; τ ;m v m2) /∈ θ,
for any correct C, τ ≤ t−∆relay − dist(C,A)v−1adv and m2 st. m v m2, and
(3) Bcast(A; t;m v m1) ∈ θ
we can derive a contradiction. To achieve this, we show, by induction, that for every N :
(3)N Bcast(AN ; tN ;m v mN ) ∈ θ where AN ∈ Vadv, tN ≤ t−N∆relay − dist(AN , A)v−1adv and m v mN
The base case (3)0 follows directly from (3). In the inductive step, we show that (3)N+1 follows from (3)N .
Apply A2 to (3)N and obtain:
(4) Receive(D; tN − δ;m v m′) ∈ θ,
where D ∈ Vadv, m v m′ and δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(D,AN )v−1adv.
Next, apply S1 to obtain:
(5) Bcast(E; tN − δ − (dist(E,D)− nlos(E,D))v−1;α′;m v m′) ∈ θ
We can rule out E ∈ Vcor based on (2) because:
tN − δ − (dist(E,D) + nlos(E,D))v−1 ≤ t−∆relay − dist(E,A)v−1adv
This inequality follows from vadv ≥ v, the inductive assumption tN ≤ t − N∆relay − dist(AN , A)v−1adv an the
condition on δ in (4). Hence we have E ∈ Vadv.
Obviously, we can define AN+1 = D, mN+1 = m
′ and tN+1 as:
tN+1 = tN − δ − (dist(E,D)− nlos(E,D))v−1 ≤ t− (N + 1)∆relay
which gives us (3)N+1, completing the inductive proof.
The final contradiction follows swiftly: Given ∆relay > 0, for large enough N , the time tN is negative. This is in
contradiction with event start times being non-negative.
Proof: (Lemma 2)
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3. We show that we can derive a contradiction by assuming:
(1) Fresh(A; t1;n) ∈ θ, where A ∈ Vcor, and
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(2) Bcast(B; t2;n v m) ∈ θ, for some B 6= A, m st. n v m, and t2 < t1 + dist(A,B)v−1adv + ∆relay
To this end, we use induction over N ∈ N to prove:
(2)N Bcast(CN ; τN ;n v mN ) ∈ θ, for some CN 6= A, mN st. n v mN , and
τN < t1 + dist(A,B)v
−1
adv − (N − 1)∆relay − dist(B,CN )v−1adv
The base case (2)0 follows directly from (2). In the inductive step, we shown that (2)N+1 follows from (2)N .
We have two cases of (2)N to cover. First, consider case:
(a) CN ∈ Vcor
Given (1), F1 implies:
(3) Receive(CN ; τN − δ1;n v m′) ∈ θ, for some δ1 ≥ ∆relay and m′ st. n v m′
Apply S1 to obtain:
(4) Bcast(D; τN − δ2;n v m′) ∈ θ, for δ2 = δ1 + (dist(D,CN ) + nlos(D,CN ))v−1 and:
(c) D ∈ Vcor or
(d) D ∈ Vadv
We can define CN+1 = D, mN+1 = m
′, and τN+1 as:
τN+1 = τN − δ2 ≤ τN −∆relay − (dist(CN+1, CN ) + nlos(CN+1, CN ))v−1 <
< t1 + dist(A,B)v
−1
adv −N∆relay − dist(B,CN+1)v−1adv
The inequality follows from the triangle inequality for dist and non-negativeness of nlos.
The last step is to show CN+1 6= A. In case (d) this is trivial, as A /∈ Vadv. In case (c) assume that CN+1 = A
and observe a contradiction with F1 because:
τN+1 < t1 + dist(A,B)v
−1
adv −N∆relay − dist(B,CN+1)v−1adv < t1
This completes the proof of the inductive step in case (a). Now consider case:
(b) CN ∈ Vadv
Given (1), A1 implies:
(5) Receive(E; τN − δ3;n v m′′) ∈ θ,
for some E ∈ Vadv, δ3 ≥ ∆relay + dist(E,CN )v−1adv and m′′ st. n v m′′
Apply S1 and S3 to obtain:
(6) Bcast(F ; τN − δ4;n v m′′) ∈ θ, for δ4 = δ3 + (dist(F,E) + nlos(F,E))v−1 and:
(e) F ∈ Vcor or
(f) F ∈ Vadv
We can define CN+1 = F , mN+1 = m
′′, and τN+1 as:
τN+1 = τN − δ4 ≤ τN < t1 + dist(A,B)v−1adv −N∆relay − dist(B,CN+1)v−1adv
The inequality follows from the triangle inequality for dist and non-negativeness of nlos.
The last step is to show CN+1 6= A. In case (f) this is trivial, as A /∈ Vadv. In case (e) we get a contradiction with
F1 if we assume that CN+1 = A. This completes the proof of the inductive step.
The final contradiction follows as in Lemma 3: Given ∆relay > 0, for large enough N , the time tN is negative.
This is in contradiction with event start times being non-negative..
Protocol PB/T
Theorem 3. Protocol PB/T satisfies ND1 and ND2B/T under the following assumptions:
(A) ∆relay ≥ Rv−1
(B) TPB/T = sup{|A, t, authA(t)|A ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0}+ Rv−1
Proof: Property ND1 (Fig. 4)
Consider a setting S and a trace θ ∈ ΘS,PB/T,A such that:
(1) Neighbor(B; t;A,C, t2) ∈ θ for some A,B,C ∈ Vcor
As B is correct, apply P4 to get:
(2) C = B and
(3) Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ, where t = t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)| and
(4) t2 ≤ t1 + Rv−1
We need to show:
(?) link(A→B, t2)
Apply S1 to obtain:
(5) link(D→B, [t2, t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|]) and
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(6) Bcast(D; t2 − δ1; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ for δ1 = (dist(D,B) + nlos(D,B))v−1 and
(a) D ∈ Vcor or
(b) D ∈ Vadv.
Consider case (a). From P2 we get D = A. Thus, given (5), we have shown (?).
Consider case (b). Let τ = pos(authA(t1) v 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉). Apply L2 to obtain:
(7) Bcast(E; t2 + τ − δ1 − δ2; authA(t1) v m) ∈ θ,
where δ2 > ∆relay and m ∈M is st. authA(t1) v m
S3 gives E ∈ Vcor. Then, apply P2 to get:
(8) E = A and
(9) m = 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉 and
(10) t1 = t2 − δ1 − δ2 < t2 −∆relay ≤ t2 −Rv−1, given (A)
From (10) derive t2 > t1 + Rv
−1. This is a contradiction with (4), thus (b) cannot be true. Consequently, (a) is
the only valid option, and ND1 is satisfied.
Property ND2B/T (Fig. 8)
Consider a setting S, where:
(1) A,B ∈ Vcor and
(2) dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B) ≤ R and
(3) link(A↔B, [t1, t1 + TPB/T ])
Next, take any trace θ ∈ ΘS,PB/T,A such that:
(4) NDstart(A; t1) ∈ θ
We need to show:
(?) Neighbor(B; t′;A,B, t′′) for some t′ ≥ t1 and t′′ ∈ [t1, t1 + TPB/T ]
Start by applying P1 to obtain:
(5) Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ
Given (2), (3) and (B), S2 implies:
(6) Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉), where t2 = t1 + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1
Given (2) we obtain t2 − t1 ≤ Rv−1. Then P3 implies:
(7) Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|;A,B, t2)
As t′ = t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)| ≥ t1 and t′′ = t2 ∈ [t1, t1 + TPB/T ] we have shown (?).
Protocol PCR/TL
Theorem 4. Protocol PCR/TL satisfies ND1 and ND2CR/TL under the following assumptions:
(A) ∆relay > 0
(B) vadv = v
(C) TPCR/TL =∞6
Proof: Property ND1 (Fig. 4)
Consider a setting S and a trace θ ∈ ΘS,PCR/TL,A such that:
(1) Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t0) ∈ θ, where A,B,C ∈ Vcor, and t, t0 ∈ R≥0.
Applying P5 gives two cases:
〈I〉 C = A: according to ND1, we need to prove link(B→A, t0)
〈II〉 B = A: according to ND1, we need to prove link(A→C, (t0 + (dist(A,C) + nlos(A,C))v−1))
We will consider both cases simultaneously. In both cases, if we rename C to B, P5 gives, for some n1, n2 ∈
Nonces, t1, t2, t3 ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3:
(2) Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ and
(3) Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ and
(4) Receive(A; t2; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ and
(5) Receive(A; t3; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ and
(6) v(t2 − t1 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l)
Further, in case 〈I〉:
(7/I) t2 = t0
6. We set TPCR/TL = ∞ for simplicity: Otherwise, we would need to assume a maximum distance between A and B to have an
upper-bound on the protocol execution time.
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whereas in case 〈II〉:
(7/II) t1 = t0
Given (5), we apply S1 to obtain:
(a) D ∈ Vcor ∧ Bcast(D; .; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ or
(b) D ∈ Vadv ∧ Bcast(D; .; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ
(“.” means that we are not concerned with the value.) Assuming (b), apply L2 to obtain Bcast(E; .;m) for some
E ∈ Vcor and m st. authB(n1, n2, l) v m. Then P3 gives for some t4 ∈ R≥0:
(8) Bcast(B; .; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ and
(9) l = loc(B) and
(10) Receive(B; t4 −∆; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ and
(11) Bcast(B; t4; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ and
(12) Fresh(B; t4;n2) ∈ θ
The same is obtained under (a) via P3. Apply S1 to (4) to get for some F ∈ V :
(13) link(F→A, [t2, t2 + |n2|]) ∧ Bcast(F ; t′′; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ
where t′′ = t2 − (dist(F,A) + nlos(F,A))v−1. We have two cases: (c) F = B and (d) F 6= B. For case (c), given
(12), F1 implies:
(c) F = B ∧ t4 ≤ t2 − (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1
In case (d), under (12), L1 implies t4 + dist(F,A)v
−1
adv + ∆relay ≤ t′′ ≤ t2 − dist(F,A)v−1. Using (B) and the
triangle inequality we derive:
(d) F 6= B ∧ t4 ≤ t2 − dist(A,B)v−1 −∆relay
Given (10), apply S1 to get for some G ∈ V :
(14) link(G→B, [t4 −∆, t4 −∆ + |〈B,n1〉|]) ∧ Bcast(G; t′′′; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ,
where t′′′ = t4 −∆− (dist(G,B) + nlos(G,B))v−1.
Again, there are two cases: (e) G = A and (f) G 6= A. In case (e), given (3), F1 implies:
(e) G = A ∧ t4 ≥ t1 + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1 + ∆
In case (f), given (3), L1 implies t1 + |B| + dist(A,G)v−1adv + ∆relay ≤ t′′′ + |B| = t4 − ∆ − (dist(G,B) +
nlos(G,B))v−1 + |B|. After simple transformations using the triangle inequality, (B), and omitting the non-
negative nlos:
(f) G 6= A ∧ t4 ≥ t1 + dist(A,B)v−1 + ∆ + ∆relay
Given (6) and (9) obtain:
(15) t2 − t1 −∆ = 2dist(A,B)v−1
There are now four possible cases to consider: (c)+(e), (c)+(f), (d)+(e) and (d)+(f).
Consider case (c)+(e):
(16) t1 + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v
−1 + ∆ ≤ t4 ≤ t2 − (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1
Given (15), both inequalities in (16) need to be equalities and nlos(A,B) = 0. As F = B, (13) implies
link(B→A, t2), which is what we needed to prove in case 〈I〉 given (7/I). Furthermore, G = A and (14) implies
link(A→B, (t4 −∆)). In case (e), given (15) and (16), t4 −∆ = t1 + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1, which given
(7/II) means that property ND1 is also satisfied in case 〈II〉. Finally, given (A), it is easy to see that the remaining
three cases are in contradiction with (15), which concludes the proof of ND1.
Property ND2CR/TL (Fig. 8)
Consider a setting S and a trace θ ∈ ΘS,PCR/TL,A.
Given (C), we assume that:
(1) NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ
(2) link(A↔B, [t1,∞))
(3) nlos(A,B) = 0
We need to prove:
(?) Neighbor(A; t′1;A,B, t
′) ∈ θ ∧ Neighbor(A; t′2;B,A, t′′) ∈ θ for some t′1, t′2 ∈ [t1,∞), t′, t′′ ∈ [t1, t1 + TPCR/TL ].
First apply P1 to obtain:
(4) Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ and
(5) Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
Next, given (2) and (3), S2 implies:
(6) Receive(B; t2; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ, where t2 = t1 + dist(A,B)v−1
Apply P2 to get:
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(7) Bcast(B; t2 + ∆; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ and
(8) Bcast(B; t2 + τ ; 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉) ∈ θ, where τ > 0.
Given (2) and (3), S2 implies:
(9) Receive(A; t4; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ, where t4 = t2 + ∆ + dist(A,B)v−1 = t1 + ∆ + 2dist(A,B)v−1 and
(10) Receive(A; t5; 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉) ∈ θ
Given (10), (4), (5), (9), and v(t4 − t1 −∆) = 2dist(A,B) we conclude the proof by P4.
Protocol PB/TL
Theorem 5. Protocol PB/TL satisfies ND1 and ND2B/TL under the following assumptions:
(A) ∆relay > 0
(B) vadv = v
(C) TPB/TL =∞7
Proof: Property ND1 (Fig. 4)
Consider a setting S and a trace θ ∈ ΘS,PB/TL,A such that:
(1) Neighbor(B; t;A,C, t2) ∈ θ for some A,B,C ∈ Vcor
As B is correct, apply P4 to get:
(2) C = B and
(3) Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)〉) ∈ θ, where t = t2 + |A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)| and
(4) t2 − t1 = d(loc(B), l)v−1
We need to show:
(?) link(A→B, t2)
Given (3), apply S1 to obtain:
(5) link(D→B, [t2, t2 + |A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)|]) and
(6) Bcast(D; t2 − δ1; 〈A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)〉) ∈ θ, for δ1 = (dist(D,B) + nlos(D,B))v−1 and
(a) D ∈ Vcor or
(b) D ∈ Vadv
Consider case (a). From P2 D = A. Thus, given (5), we have shown (?).
Consider case (b). Let τ = pos(authAB(t1, l) v 〈A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)〉). Apply L3, to obtain:
(7) Bcast(E; t2 + τ − δ1 − δ2; authAB(t1, l) v m) ∈ θ,
where δ2 ≥ ∆relay + dist(E,D)v−1adv and m ∈M is st. authAB(t1, l) v m
S3 gives E ∈ Vcor. Then, apply P2 to get one of the two cases:
(c) E = A ∧ m = 〈A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))〉 ∧ t1 = t2 − δ1 − δ2 or
(d) E = B ∧ m = 〈B, t1, loc(B), authAB(t1, loc(B))〉 ∧ t1 = t2 − δ1 − δ2
First consider (c). Using the triangle inequality, (B) and (A), we derive t1 = t2 − δ1 − δ2 ≤ t2 − (dist(D,B) +
nlos(D,B))v−1−∆relay− dist(A,D)v−1adv ≤ t2− dist(A,B)v−1−∆relay < t2− dist(A,B)v−1. As l = loc(A), this
is a contradiction with (4), thus (c) cannot be true.
Consider case (d). In this case l = loc(B), and (4) implies t1 = t2. This is in contradiction with t1 = t2−δ1−δ2 ≤
t2−∆relay < t2. Hence (d) cannot be true, and thus (b) cannot be true. Consequently, (a) is the only valid option,
and ND1 is satisfied.
Property ND2B/TL (Fig. 8)
Consider a setting S, where:
(1) A,B ∈ Vcor and
(2) nlos(A,B) = 0 and
(3) link(A↔B, [t1,∞))
Next, take any trace θ ∈ ΘS,PB/TL,A such that:
(4) NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ
We need to show:
(?) Neighbor(B; t′;A,B, t′′) for some t′ ≥ t1 and t′′ ≥ t1
Start by applying P1 to obtain:
(5) Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))〉) ∈ θ
Given (3), S2 implies:
7. We assume TPB/TL =∞ for simplicity: : Otherwise, we would need to assume a maximum distance between A and B to have an
upper-bound on the protocol execution time.
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(6) Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))〉), where t2 = t1 + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1
Given (2) we obtain t2 − t1 = dist(A,B)v−1. Then P3 implies:
(7) Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))|;A,B, t2)
Obviously, t′ = t2 + |A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))| ≥ t1 and t′′ = t2 ≥ t1, and we have shown (?).
Protocol PCR/T
Theorem 6. Protocol PCR/T satisfies ND1 and ND2CR/T under the following assumptions:
(A) ∆relay > 2Rv
−1
(B) TPCR/TL = sup{|B,n|+ |authB(n)|B ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0, n ∈ Nonces}+ 2Rv−1
Proof: Property ND1 (Fig. 4)
Consider a setting S and a trace θ ∈ ΘS,PCR/T,A such that:
(1) Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t0) ∈ θ, where A,B,C ∈ Vcor, and t, t0 ∈ R≥0.
Applying P6 gives two cases:
〈I〉 C = A: according to ND1, we need to prove link(B→A, t0)
〈II〉 B = A: according to ND1, we need to prove link(A→C, (t0 + (dist(A,C) + nlos(A,C))v−1))
We will consider both cases simultaneously. In both cases, if we rename C to B, P6 gives, for some n1 ∈
Nonces, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0:
(2) Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ and
(3) Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ and
(4) Receive(A; t2; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ and
(5) t2 − t1 −∆ ≤ 2Rv−1
Further, in case 〈I〉:
(6/I) t2 = t0
whereas in case 〈II〉:
(6/II) t1 = t0
Given (4), we apply S1 to obtain for some D ∈ V :
(7) link(D→A, [t2, t2 + |authB(n1)|]) and for t3 = t2 − (dist(A,D) + nlos(A,D))v−1:
(a) D ∈ Vcor ∧ Bcast(D; t3; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ or
(b) D ∈ Vadv ∧ Bcast(D; t3; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ
First consider (a). Apply P4 to get:
(8/a) B = D ∧ Bcast(B; t3; authB(n1)) ∈ θ and
(9/a) Receive(B; t3 −∆; 〈A,B, n1〉) ∈ θ
Given (9/a), apply S1 to obtain for some F ∈ V , t′ = t3 −∆, and t′′ = t′ − (dist(F,B) + nlos(F,B))v−1:
(10/a) link(F→B, [t′, t′ + |B,n1|]) ∧ Bcast(F ; t′′; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
Two cases arise: (c) F = A and (d) F 6= A. Given (3), in case (c) apply F1, and in case (d) apply L1 to obtain:
(c/a) F = A ∧ t′′ ≥ t1 or
(d/a) F 6= A ∧ t′′ ≥ t1 + ∆relay + dist(F,A)v−1adv
Consider case (c/a). As F = A, given A ∈ Vcor and S3, (10/a) states that
Bcast(A; t′′; 〈A,B, n1〉) ∈ θ. Apply P2 to get:
(11/ac) Fresh(A; t′′ + |B|;n1) ∈ θ
Given (11/ac) and (2), F1 implies t′′ ≤ t1, which under (c/a) gives t′′ = t1. Thus, t1 = t2 − 2(dist(A,B) +
nlos(A,B))v−1 −∆. Given B = D, (7) implies link(B→A, t2), which proves 〈I〉 given (6/I). Further, F = A and
(10/a) give link(A→B, t1 + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1), which given (6/II) proves 〈II〉. All that remains to
show is that cases (d/a) and (b) are not possible.
Consider case (d/a). It is straightforward to derive t2 − t1 −∆ ≥ ∆relay. Thus, given (A), t2 − t1 −∆ > 2Rv−1,
which is in contradiction with (5). Hence (d/a) is not possible.
Next, consider (b). Apply S3 to get D ∈ Vadv and then L2 followed by P4 to obtain:
(8/b) Bcast(B; t3 − δ1; authB(n1)) ∈ θ, where δ1 ≥ ∆relay + dist(D,E)v−1adv and
(9/b) Receive(B; t3 − δ1 −∆; 〈A,B, n1〉) ∈ θ
The only difference between (9/a) and (9/b) is a different timestamp, which in case (b) is t′ = t3 − δ1 −∆. We
can thus repeat a nearly identical reasoning, deriving (10/b), (c/b) and (d/b). However, as the timestamp t′ in
case (b) “includes” ∆relay, we can easily show that (c/b) and (d/b) are in contradiction with (5). This concludes
the proof of ND1.
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Property ND2CR/T (Fig. 8)
Consider a setting S and a trace θ ∈ ΘS,PCR/T,A.
Given (C), we assume that:
(1) NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ
(2) link(A↔B, [t1, t1 + TPCR/T ])
(3) dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B) ≤ R
We need to prove:
(?) Neighbor(A; t′1;A,B, t
′) ∈ θ ∧ Neighbor(A; t′2;B,A, t′′) ∈ θ
for some t′1, t
′
2 ∈ [t1,∞), t′, t′′ ∈ [t1, t1 + TPCR/T ].
First apply P1 to obtain:
(4) Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ and
(5) Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
Next, given (2) and (3), S2 implies:
(6) Receive(B; t2; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ, where t2 = t1 + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1
Apply P3 to get:
(7) Bcast(B; t2 + ∆; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ and
Given (2), S2 implies:
(8) Receive(A; t3; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ,
where t3 = t2 + ∆ + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v
−1 = t1 + ∆ + 2(dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1
Given (4), (5), (8), (3), and t3 − t1 −∆ ≤ 2Rv−1 conclude the proof by P5.
